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INOVATIVNE OBVEZNICE U FINANCIRANJU 
JAVNIH POTREBA
ABSTRACT: The realization of public tasks often requires debt fundraising. Basi-
cally, bonds are the main type of debt instruments used by the public sector. However, a 
high level of public debt and its permanent increase over the past few years force public 
managers to seek new solutions, other than debt creation, to Þ nance public tasks. The main 
goal of this paper is to present and discuss new, innovative solutions on the construction of 
bonds in the light of Þ nancing public tasks by means of this very instrument.
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SAŽETAK: Ispunjenje javnih potreba ?esto se Þ nancira izdavanjem dužni?kih in-
strumenata. Na?elno govore?i, u javnom se sektoru za prikupljanje kapitala naj?eš?e slu-
žimo obveznicama. Me?utim, visoke razine javnog duga i njegov stalni rast tijekom pro-
teklih nekoliko godina prisilile su menadžere u javnom sektoru da na?u nova rješenja za 
Þ nanciranje javnih potreba i izbjegnu stvaranje duga. Glavni cilj ovoga rada je predstaviti 
i razmotriti nova, inovativna rješenja u strukturi obveznica koje se izdaju sa svrhom Þ nan-
ciranja javnih potreba.
KLJU?NE RIJE?I: obveznice, dužni?ki instrumenti, javne Þ nancije, inovacije u 
javnom sektoru.
1. INTRODUCTION
A shortage of Þ scal resources and the willingness to provide public services at high 
standards push central and local powers to seek the funding of public tasks realization 
by means of taking debt. Generally, central government and local self-government units 
seek Þ nancial support in banks, which provide them with loans, and in Þ nancial markets 
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by means of issuing debt instruments, bonds in particular. Unfortunately, loans and bonds 
increase the level of public debt, which is controversial, and which European and national 
regulations attempt to put a curb on. Therefore, authorities try to Þ nd new, alternative ways 
to support the realization of public goals without enlarging public debt. In this paper, the 
author tries to indicate new possible innovative ways of solving public problems without 
increasing public liabilities or increasing them less than proportionally, by means of using 
bonds in a non-standard way.
2. INNOVATIVE BONDS IN BONDS’ CLASSIFICATION
Generally, a bond is a debt security that promises to make payments periodically for 
a speciÞ ed period of time (Mishkin, 2004, pp. 3-4). Conventional bonds are standard debt 
instruments which mainly represent the liability of their issuer to pay interest in the future 
and to return the principal (par or nominal value) of the debt. Such a security is called a 
“straight”, “plain vanilla” or “bullet” bond, which signiÞ es that there are no additional fea-
tures attached to this liability (Choudhry, 2006, p. 3). This approach is common in raising 
debt capital to Þ nance private and public activities, and these bonds account for the majority 
of debt instruments traded globally.
Different forms of such debt instruments can also be found in Þ nancial markets. They 
have a different construction, some additional privileges and risks for the issuer and inves-
tor, in particular. For example, a bond may not pay coupons, so it may be sold below par 
value (zero-coupon bond). What is more important – under speciÞ ed conditions, a bond 
can be converted into a stock (convertible bond), or it can give the bondholder the right to 
decide about the issuer company, the right to receive a part of income (as a stakeholder), or 
the right to subscribe to stocks of a new issue (“privileged” bonds) (Socha, 2003, p. 120-
125). However, such constructions of bonds tend to be dedicated to the private sector only.
In turn, as mentioned above, the public sector typically uses a conventional, standard 
type of bonds. It follows from the public Þ nance construction – the realization of public 
tasks should be Þ nanced from public incomes, particularly from taxes or other public bur-
dens. The lack of irreclaimable resources pushes public authorities to use additional forms 
of Þ nancing, which are repayable (loans, debt securities), and the use of which results in 
public debt creation. Such ways of funding public tasks can, on the one hand, allow achiev-
ing goals immediately, but on the other hand, the resultant debt becomes a burden for future 
budgets, in this way restraining the future plans of the authorities and societies. The public 
debt service is simply a transfer payment between bondholders and future taxpayers (Back-
haus, Wagner, 2004, pp. 198-199).
Considering the problems of the public issuer connected with excessive debt growth, 
problems to meet debt limitations in particular, there exists a set of different solutions to 
funding public tasks. Sometimes these solutions resemble the Þ nancial constructions used 
by the private sector.
In this paper, the author focuses on the use of bonds by the public sector; therefore, 
only public bonds shall be considered. To set the presentation in order, a classiÞ cation of 
different types of public bonds can be found in Table 1. Public bonds can be classiÞ ed using 
different criteria. The author suggests applying the following three ones: the payments con-
struction, the responsibility for the debt and the purpose of Þ nancing.
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Under the Þ rst criterion, we can distinguish between coupon bonds, zero-coupon 
bonds and perpetual bonds. Coupon bonds consist of securities which repay the principal 
and the coupons – an additional value, which can be Þ xed, indexed to market interest rates 
or the inß ation rate, or revisable (e.g., as an effect of discussion between issuer and holder, 
mainly junk bonds, Brady bonds). In turn, zero-coupon bonds do not pay coupons; hence, 
they are issued at a price lower than the nominal value, and promise to pay the par value 
on redemption date. A rare type of debt instrument is the perpetual bond. Basically, those 
bonds are not to be redeemed and the issuer is obliged to pay coupons for an indeÞ nite peri-
od (Yglesias 2013). For example, in Poland, the Þ rst possible redemption of such a debt can 
be made after Þ ve years from the date of issuance, or following issuer bankruptcy (the Act 
on Bonds of 2015, art. 23). The Þ rst well-known example of this type of bonds is the English 
consols (consolidated annuities) which were issued by the British Government in the 1700’s. 
The consols paid interest on an annual basis just like regular bonds, but with no requirement 
that the government ever redeem them by repaying the face value (Yglesias 2013). Perpetual 
bonds are now becoming increasingly popular, especially in the USA, where the value of 
new issues in 2015 exceeded 38 billion dollars (Atkins, Hale 2015). Their popularity seems 
to be the effect of very low interest rates in recent years, and investors’ need for the relative-
ly higher yield of these bonds compared to regular debt instruments. 
Generally, the debt incorporated in bonds may be either collateralized or unsecured – in 
case of the public sector, bonds are mainly backed by the full faith, credit, and the taxing pow-
er of the central and local government, which is why they are called general obligation bonds. 
Nonetheless, they can also be secured on a particular entity’s assets and revenues – revenue 
bonds. Such an entity will be separated from the authority (Fabozzi 2005, pp. 3-4). Thus, the 
second criterion used to distinguish bonds is issuer responsibility for the debt. Basically, the 
majority of securities traded on Þ nancial markets are general obligation bonds. These securi-
ties are not backed by any assets, but by the power of the authority (issuer). The other group of 
bonds include securities which reduce – in different ways – the responsibility of their issuer (a 
public sector entity), and they are: revenue bonds, project bonds, social impact bonds.
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The idea behind funding public tasks by using revenue bonds is to separate the reali-
zation of certain public goals from the basic activity of the public entity involved. With this 
kind of funding, it is required to create a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which is an entity 
separated from the authority, but which operates on a speciÞ ed public task. Such a form of 
activity is typically called project Þ nance, and it can be used to realize public, private or 
public-private targets. The SPV can raise capital for its activity by issuing revenue bonds. 
The investor’s gains (interest and par value) are generated from the activity of the SPV, and 
they are backed by the assets and/or on the revenues of the SPV, which means they seem to 
be safe securities. On the other hand, the authority (SPV owner) can exclude its full respon-
sibility (and limit it to the value of the collateral) when a project Þ nanced by those bonds 
fails. In case of general obligation bonds, the authority would be fully responsible, even if 
the project does not succeed.
Another kind of bonds with limited engagement of public entities in the realization of 
public tasks, which also uses the concept of SPV, is project bonds (PBs). The idea behind 
project bonds is to enable the private sector to achieve public goals with a partial Þ nancial 
support of the public sector. The main part of SPV funding needs to be provided by the 
private sector, whilst the relatively small but signiÞ cant part of SPV’s liabilities consists of 
public funds, or of private funds, guaranteed by public authorities. This approach allows 
the government to obtain public goals “with private hands”, and the private sector is also 
interested in such projects because of public guarantees which increase the creditability of 
the project and lower its funding costs. Moreover, a project supported by the authorities in 
some way ensures its success.
Another solution to ensure the provision of public services, without fully engaging the 
public sector in their realization and funding, is social impact bonds (SIBs). This instrument 
is not a standard bond as it is a conditional commitment of the authorities. The idea behind 
these securities is connected with a Þ nancing model called “payment for result”. The au-
thority promises to pay for certain services, which are of public character but provided by 
a private entity (Callanan, Law, 2012, p. 3). The private entity organizes social intervention 
(e.g., resocialization activities, reducing the homelessness rate, supporting the education 
among the youth with family problems), and when its actions succeed, the authority pays for 
it (Costa, Shah, Ungar 2012, p. 3; GrifÞ ths, Meinicke, 2014, pp. 7-9). This model requires 
private Þ nancial resources, funds from social investors in particular, who are ready to take 
the risk of their capital not being repaid in case of project failure (Marchewka-Bartkowiak, 
Wi?niewski, 2015, pp. 220-221).
Using the third criterion – the purpose of Þ nancing, we can distinguish between gen-
eral bonds, which are used to obtain funds for all kinds of public activities, and “theme” 
bonds, which allow obtaining Þ nancial resources to Þ nance certain type of tasks. For ex-
ample, during wartime, many countries used bonds, the so called war bonds, to Þ nance 
their military needs. In history, we can also Þ nd bonds issued to raise money for huge in-
frastructural investments such as the construction of railroads (railroad bonds) or highways 
(highway bonds). Lately, following the observed climate changes, climate or green bonds 
have become a popular kind of securities.
The contemporary development of the green bonds (GBs) market is a sign of our 
time. The growing role of green investments, as a goal of sustainable development, shows 
that the economic and social evolution cannot be carried out without nature preservation. 
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Green projects need green Þ nance, and it is a reason to label bonds and create contemporary 
“theme” bonds, i.e. green bonds (Wi?niewski, Zieli?ski, 2017).
Green bonds are similar or even the same as regular bonds in terms of their structure. 
The main question is “how green” a project should be to be included in a green bond issue, 
and how stakeholders will go about measuring greenness (Wood, Grace, 2011, p. 3). The 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) in Green Bond Principles, published in 
2016, deÞ ned the green bond as a security differentiated from a regular bond by its label 
that the issuer undertakes to exclusively use the funds raised to Þ nance or re-Þ nance Green 
Projects, assets or business activities. All designated Green Project categories should pro-
vide clear environmental beneÞ ts which will be assessed and quantiÞ ed by the issuer. Thus, 
in addition to evaluating standard Þ nancial characteristics (such as price, coupon, maturity 
and credit quality of the issuer), investors also assess the speciÞ c environmental allocation 
of the projects that the bonds will support (ICMA, 2016, p. 2).
The presented classiÞ cations demonstrate a great variety of bonds. As mentioned be-
fore, most bonds on the market consists of regular securities, constructed in a simple way. 
However, the contemporary world seeks innovative Þ nancial solutions also to fund public 
tasks realization. That is the reason why more sophisticated constructions of bonds are 
applied.
In order to specify which bonds can be called innovative we should consider their 
potential to accumulate funds intended for public activities, particularly the accessibility of 
resources, and their cost. In this respect, we should distinguish the two following groups of 
these instruments:
- the “new” kind of bonds (invented and applied lately):
- project bonds,
- social impact bonds,
- green bonds,
- the “old”, well-known kind of bonds, used in an innovative way (e.g., revenue 
bonds, perpetual bonds).
The Þ rst group of bonds must be regarded as innovative bonds, because of their new-
ness. The second group represents all the well-known solutions, which can also be called 
innovative because of their application in an atypical way (e.g., revenues bonds without 
exclusion of the issuer’s responsibility), or because they just have been adopted in legislation 
in certain countries (e.g., perpetual bonds in Poland).
3. EXAMPLES OF INNOVATIVE PUBLIC BONDS
Having deÞ ned the concept of different kind of bonds, the author now wishes to pres-
ent the application of those instruments using a number of certain examples, showing po-
tential opportunities and threats that the application of those instruments poses.
The best-known example of using project bonds to Þ nance public tasks is the con-
cept known as the Project Bond Initiative launched in 2012 by the European Commission 
and the European Investment Bank. The initiative was addressed to Þ nance infrastructure 
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projects in the TEN-T, TEN-E or information and communication technology. It aimed to 
respond to the expectations of the institutional investors, with €230 million EU budgetary 
funds allocated, and it was expected to stimulate up to €4.4 billion worth of investments 
with a multiplier of 19x on EU budgetary funds. (EIB 2012a).
The founding idea behind this initiative was to widen access to Þ nancial resources 
and to minimize overall funding costs. Under the Project Bond Initiative, the EIB was able 
to provide eligible infrastructure projects with the support called Project Bonds Credit En-
hancement (PBCE) in the form of a subordinated instrument – either a loan or contingent 
facility – to support senior project bonds issued by the project company (senior bonds). The 
main beneÞ t of this action is the enhancement it brings to the credit ratings of the senior 
bonds. Moreover, the PBCE could bring additional depth to the infrastructure mezzanine 
Þ nance market and, particularly in its unfunded form, an innovative approach to credit 
enhancing infrastructure transactions in a straightforward manner. The pilot phase of the 
initiative was conducted until 2016 (EBI 2012b, p. 5).
The described initiative provides two ways of credit enhancement, which results in a 
relatively lower cost of the funded project: (1) funded subordinated option – the mezzanine 
loan, and (2) unfunded subordinated option – the guarantee (see Figure 1). 
    
Figure 1. General mechanism of project bonds Þ nancing
Source: author’s own work on the basis of: EIB 2013; Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Wi?niewski, 2014, pp. 147-148.
In Þ nancing PPP projects, the government can provide direct Þ nancial support and 
this mechanism is particularly important if the project is not Þ nancially self-sufÞ cient, or is 
at risks of private investors or creditors being unable to operate effectively. The described 
initiative is more of an indirect public support, the purpose of which is to achieve a certain 
result or certain quality of infrastructure services, in which the government, instead of 
direct participation in project Þ nancing, assumes indirect Þ nancial obligations (Shuliuk, 
2016, p. 259). 
The Þ rst results of the initiative show that the idea of project bonds does work. In 
the pilotage phase, seven projects were supported by the EIB, and in each case, credit en-
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For example, in case of the Castor project in Spain, the credit rating of the issued project 
bands was even higher than the credit rating of Spain itself. In Belgium, the PBCE, together 
with a subordinated debt tranche of the EIB, increased the credit rating of the bonds by 
three notches to A3. Without the PBCE the underlying credit quality would have been Baa3 
(Ernst&Young, 2015).
The next innovative type of bonds described above is social impact bonds. The SIBs, 
which are a form of payment-by-result (PBR) model, differ from earlier approaches to the 
Þ nancing of service providers in such a way that their Þ nancing is structured. They are Þ -
nanced by initial investments undertaken exclusively by private or philanthropic investors, 
and the government will pay the investors if and only if the results have been achieved. 
Financial rewards for the SIBs are attached to social outcomes (the results). The SIBs are 
intended to transfer Þ nancial risk away from the public sector to the private sector, and at 
the same time they give investors and service providers a greater freedom in designing and 
delivering their services. In this way, the government hopes to improve both accountability 
and quality in the provision of public services. SIBs also differ from PBRs in that funds (the 
initial investments) are usually paid upfront (Mulvaney, Kriegler, 2014, pp. 3-4).
Figure 2. The general mechanism of social impact bonds Þ nancing
Source: author’s own work on the basis of: GrifÞ ths, Meinicke, 2014, pp. 7-9; Costa, Shah, Ungar, 2012, pp. 3-4; 
Callanan, Law, 2012, pp. 3-4; Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Wi?niewski, 2015, p. 211.
In the UK, the Þ rst SIB was launched in 2010 – the intervention was taken to reduce 
the rate of recidivism amongst prisoners at Peterborough Prison, all of whom were serving 
one year periods or less and classiÞ ed as low risk. The money raised from SIBs allowed hir-
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ing an NGO to manage the program to reduce reoffending. Recidivism had to be decreased 
by at least 7.5 per cent to trigger the dividend payments in each of the six years of the 
bond’s lifetime. An independent assessor was to determine the outcome. If the predeÞ ned 
outcomes were not achieved, no money would be refunded to investors (Ministry of Justice, 
2012, pp. 1-3).
While preparing this paper, 77 SIBs have been implemented in 20 countries, and at 
least 34 new SIBs were at the design stage (Instiglio 2017). About a half of interventions 
concerned social welfare projects – the next policy areas were as follows: employment, 
education and criminal justice. The SIB contract duration was from 20 to 120 months, but 
most projects were launched for up to 50 months (Noya, Galitopoulou, 2016).
The idea of SIB is being adopted in Poland, too – the Polish Ministry of Development 
launched a contest for SIBs in 2016, in two approaches (direct SIB and SIB’s accelerator) for 
more than PLN 30 million, Þ nanced from the resources of the European Social Fund (the 
Ministry of Development, 2016). The pilot phase starts in 2017 – Þ ve direct SIBs and three 
SIB’s accelerator projects were chosen for Þ nancing.
Another innovative instrument, which can be used by the public sector, is green 
bonds (GBs). The green bond market is a rising segment of the Þ nancial market, and the 
GBs are an increasing part of climate-aligned securities. In 2016, the annual issuance of 
GBs exceeded USD 80 billion, which is to be almost doubled this year (CBI, 2017a). The 
biggest GBs issuers so far have been: the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, 
and the International Investment Corporation – entities with the highest creditability grades 
(Climate Brief, 2012, p. 3). Therefore, 78% of GBs are investment grade (with BBB rating 
and higher) (CBI 2016, p. 4).
Green investments are also supported by the public sector. Local self-government is-
sued GBs for the Þ rst time in 2013 (the Commonwealth of Massachusetts), but by December 
2016 no country had decided to issue green bonds (Green City Bonds Coalition, 2016, p. 9). 
The Þ rst state that issued green bonds was Poland. The issuance took place on 13 Decem-
ber 2016 and was welcomed with great interest by investors, which subsequently allowed 
increasing the issuance amount from 500 to 750 million worth of euro. The proÞ tability 
of this type of securities is a bit lower than the standard proÞ tability of bonds on the euro 
market. (the Ministry of Development and Finance, 2016). Through this Poland became the 
Þ rst country to have issued a sovereign Green Bond. 
The second issuance of sovereign GBs took place in France in 2017 for the value of 
7 billion euro. The next issuance is expected in Nigeria also in 2017 (CBI, 2017b). These 
examples show that GBs are a new trend in Þ nancial markets and public Þ nance.
Apart from the securities described above, we can also point to some other bonds, 
which have been used for a long time, but due to some changes in their construction and 
legal regulations investors may take an interest in them. Firstly, revenue bonds (RBs) still 
stand a great chance to become a popular form of Þ nancing public tasks. For example, in 
Poland until 2014, this type of bonds would have been issued only by the municipal com-
panies (transportation or water and sewage companies). Even though they were backed by 
the SPV’s assets, the attractiveness of these securities was reduced. The main reason for 
this was that cities, which are owners of those companies, on the one hand, limited their 
responsibility for the debt to SPV’s assets and revenues, but on the other hand, they kept 
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determining fare rates for the public transport or fee rates for water supply, which are the 
real revenues of the companies – issuers of RBs.
A turning point occurred in 2014 when the City of Lublin itself issued its own RBs, 
rather than one of its companies. The following year the City of Nysa duplicated this 
idea. In both the cases, the municipalities did not exclude their responsibility for the debt 
(Wi?niewski, 2016, pp. 191-192). This evidence shows that perhaps RGs should be issued 
without limiting the issuer’s responsibility to certain assets, but with the use of these assets 
only as extra collateral to general obligation of the public sector entity. Moreover, in Poland, 
the additional advantage to local self-government for using GBs is the possibility to exclude 
such a security from the legal debt limitation.
Finally, yet another type of bonds, which is considered innovative is the perpetual 
bond. This instrument, as mentioned in the previous section, has for long been used to 
Þ nance public tasks. Apart from the British consols of 1700’s, we can also Þ nd this type 
of bonds for example in Þ nancing infrastructural projects (water dams) in the Netherlands 
in 1600’s (Cummings, 2015). Nowadays, these bonds are generally used by banks, because 
they can be counted as Tier I in capital calculations. However, there are no obstacles to 
using those bonds by public sector entities, too.
4. THE NECESSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF USING 
INNOVATIVE PUBLIC BONDS – FINDINGS 
Basing on the examples presented in the previous sections, we shall now discuss the 
pros and cons of each type of innovative bonds. The author will focus in particular on the 
need to introduce new bonds solutions and on using them in a rational way. As it was stated, 
innovative bonds should show the potential to raise funds for public activities, regarding the 
accessibility of the resources and their cost.
We might argue that if there does appear a new kind of bond, it means that there is a 
need for it. But it could just as well be an attempt to solve a problem in a different way, an at-
tempt which may not be a perfect solution. In order to analyze this problem, we should carry 
out a certain kind of strengths and weaknesses analysis for each bond type. It is obvious that 
the reason why all of the bonds discussed in this paper are issued is that the issuer expects 
a greater demand for them which translates into lower costs of Þ nancing, which in turn can 
be considered to be their common strength. Some other strengths, as well as weaknesses, of 
the indicated types of innovative bonds are presented in Table 2.
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Source: author’s own work.
The construction of project bonds and green bonds is rather clear and correct. The 
tasks Þ nanced by those bonds are generally of commercial or semi-commercial character, 
and maybe that is why it is advisable to engage the private and third sector in their realiza-
tion. In such a case, the public sector acts as a guarantor of the projects, which is fruitful 
for the creditability assessment of the projects, and which lowers their Þ nancing costs. The 
partial participation of the public sector or its guarantees or “green-labelling” are enough to 
enhance the creditability of the project.
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It looks different in the case of social impact bonds. The public authority pays some 
other entities for providing public services, and decides to pay for the actual effects only. 
This solution is more controversial. From the public point of view, the use of these bonds 
means that the public sector is not able to fulÞ l public tasks on its own. Therefore, perhaps 
there is a need to modify the previous methods of solving public problems by the public 
sector rather than commissioning its realization to private or non-governmental organiza-
tions. Such a problem occurred in the case of the Peterborough SIBs – the Þ rst SIBs ever. 
Because the UK government changed the “prison policy”, which now pays more attention 
to rehabilitation, today such an intervention would not stand a chance of success. The same 
problems can be faced with regard to many other social interventions.
Social activities are delicate in their nature, but their cost and economic effectiveness 
should be the main targets for optimization. Many examples show that the projects Þ nanced 
by SIBs help solve certain problems that ought to be solved by the public sector. The main 
objection to using SIBs is that they only solve social problems in one particular case (or 
a restricted group of cases) – e.g., they reduce recidivism in Peterborough Prison, while 
inmates with the same needs cannot receive the same assistance at any other penitentiary 
institutions. Therefore, we should be satisÞ ed with the results from certain interventions, 
but we should be concerned with the fact that this solution is not widespread. Obviously, 
this is a problem concerning the scale of the intervention, but the real problem lies in the 
following question – is intervention (Þ nanced with SIBs) really necessary? The answer is 
difÞ cult because the SIBs Þ nancing model occurs only in the “intermediate” models of 
the social policies of the State. In the fully interventionist or fully liberalistic approaches 
to public tasks realization there is no place for SIBs. The State either fully supports social 
needs or it does not altogether. 
The next dilemma concerning SIBs is the possibility to Þ nd socially responsible in-
vestors. In the author’s opinion, it depends on the welfare of particular societies. We should 
emphasise that SIBs projects were introduced in Anglo-Saxon countries, i.e. relatively 
wealthy countries with societies that are largely socially aware. In other countries, the suc-
cess of SIBs issuance depends on the existence of philanthropic investors, which may pose 
problems in emerging economies or third world countries.
Despite of the negative features of SIBs, as described above, they can truly set a new 
direction in solving social problems. An analysis conducted by SIBs market researchers 
shows that there is an enormous variation in the deals with respect to the structure, me-
chanics, and stakeholder roles, which is one reason for optimism in that this demonstrates 
a great deal of ß exibility in how a deal can be structured. (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, 
Putcha, 2015, p. 49). The added value of SIBs projects is their innovative, unusual, and 
even unpredictable design, made by experts with experience in both commercial and social 
Þ elds. Thus, the SIBs projects realized these days may serve as a typical model for public 
sector activities in the future.
Yet another type of bonds – green bonds (GBs) – is the contemporary theme bond. 
Green-labelling of bonds can enhance the creditability of the project and summon socially re-
sponsible investors. The main danger of using these bonds is the abuse of green-labelling, as a 
result of which the attribute “green” can possibly lose its signiÞ cance for investors in the future.
The next discussed type of bonds – revenue bonds – can be used in project Þ nance 
in particular. Their mechanism can be applied to setting up a public-private partnership, 
70 Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, godina 16, br. 2., 2018.
which can ensure the realization of public tasks with private resources. On the other hand, 
revenue bonds – as shown above – can be issued by a public entity without exclusion of its 
responsibility for the debt. Hence, the revenue bond can be the general obligation bond with 
the reinforcement of separated assets and the revenue they generate as the collateral of the 
bond. It can enhance the creditability assessment of a certain debt, thus lowering its cost. In 
these two ways, RBs are to be considered a desirable form of Þ nancing public tasks.
The Þ nal type of bonds to be discussed is perpetual bonds. Even though they were 
used to Þ nance public goals in the past, today their use in this respect is rather controver-
sial. These bonds – in comparison to general bonds – by their very nature should provide 
extraordinary proÞ ts. It means that demand for such bonds could be above average, but their 
costs would be also too excessive. In case of these bonds, some debt limitations provided for 
in the legal system are the proper solution. They ought to protect the society against some 
irresponsible decisions of policy makers, who might be tempted to use this instrument not 
accountably. It seems that the perpetual bond may be used by the public sector in the face 
of danger, e.g. state of war, when huge amounts of Þ nancial resources are needed while the 
time of their repayment is not predictable.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The considerations carried out in this paper show a huge diversity in bonds mecha-
nisms. Apart from regular bonds, which account for the majority of public debt securities, 
we can also Þ nd many types of bonds used in non-standard way. For example, they can 
be applied to create a special funding for some public-private partnership special purpose 
vehicle (i.e. project bonds), or they can be used in some conditional arrangements, in which 
the public sector pays on condition that some speciÞ ed objectives have been achieved (i.e. 
social impact bonds). This type of funding is like having your cake and eating it too – a 
public manager can achieve some public goals without being fully involved in Þ nancing 
them. Such an approach reduces the Þ nancial engagement of the public sector in the real-
ization of public tasks. Public goals can be achieved by letting the private sector or NGOs 
participate in their realization. Obviously, the problem lies in assessing the effectiveness of 
such actions, but as long as it helps to solve some problems with a decreased engagement of 
public Þ nances, it is a solution to be considered.
The present-day need for a sustainable, green development forces the application of 
a special instrument – green bonds. The use of labelled instruments is an answer to this 
need, an answer which can obtain resources from the socially responsible investor. The 
above presented examples show that sovereign green bonds issuances meet surplus demand; 
therefore, this is the way to Þ nd creditors for public activities in the future.
Of all the standard bonds used for a long time, which can still help Þ nance public tasks, 
only revenue bonds deserve attention. The public sector can still design a new, innovative 
mechanism of these bonds, e.g. the construction of public side responsibility for the debt. In 
turn, the other kind of bond described in this paper – the perpetual bond, is basically meant for 
“hard times”, and its application by authorities in standard conditions remains controversial.
The main goal of this paper was to show the diversity of public bonds solutions. The 
considered pros and cons of different types of this security demonstrate that there exist 
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broad possibilities for bonds construction, which can in various ways contribute to the im-
provement of public tasks Þ nancing.
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